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The Edgeworth Conjecture with Small Coalitions and
Approximate Equilibria in Large Economies
Siddharth Barman∗ Federico Echenique†
Abstract
We revisit the connection between bargaining and equilibrium in exchange economies, and
study its algorithmic implications. We consider bargaining outcomes to be allocations that cannot
be blocked (i.e., profitably re-traded) by coalitions of small size and show that these allocations
must be approximate Walrasian equilibria. Our results imply that deciding whether an allocation
is approximately Walrasian can be done in polynomial time, even in economies for which finding
an equilibrium is known to be computationally hard.
1 Introduction
Wepresent a quantitative core convergence theorem, with economic and algorithmic implications. Economists
have, since Francis Edgeworth in 1881, been interested in the convergence of bargaining in finite
economies to market equilibrium. The celebrated Edgeworth conjecture states that bargaining inde-
terminacy and monopoly power disappear in large economies. Edgeworth focused on the contract
curve, what we think of now as the core. The core, however, requires agents to join coalitions of
arbitrary size. In our quantitative core convergence theorem we show that coalitions of a fixed size
suffice. The fixed size depends polynomially on the approximation error, the number of goods in the
economy, and consumers’ heterogeneity.
The economic analysis of markets is based on the notion of Walrasian (competitive) market equi-
librium and price-taking behavior. Walrasian equilibrium requires that goods are assigned prices,
each agent maximizes her utility subject to what she can afford, and the market clears. Walrasian
equilibria provide a conceptually crisp framework for economic analysis: with prices as guide, agents
direct themselves, in a decentralized manner, to a Pareto optimal allocation. That agents are price
takers means that they treat prices as fixed; they will not renegotiate the terms of trade with other
agents.
The Edgeworth conjecture, or core convergence, is the economist’s basic justification for the price-
taking assumption. Specifically, it postulates that, in a large economy, bargaining collapses to Wal-
rasian equilibrium, i.e., in a large economy, no group of agents would choose to upset an equilibrium
by renegotiating among themselves.
In a small economy, agents bargain over the terms of trade. They may not trade at fixed prices.
Each individual agent in a small economy is to some degree unique and can therefore command a cer-
tain degree of monopoly power. Imagine the market for professional soccer players, or high-profile
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academics, in which each individual agent is special. Then terms of trade are determined by haggling
and bargaining, not as fixed prices in competitive markets. By contrast, in a large economy with lim-
ited heterogeneity, no agent is special. Imagine the market for a commodity, like corn or steel, or
for a standard piece of technology, like a personal desktop. In such economies, bargaining outcomes
(formally, outcomes in the core) should collapse to the competitive outcomes that correspond to a
Walrasian equilibrium. This claim is the Edgeworth conjecture.
Bargaining is a complex process, and difficult—arguably impossible—to model in detail. So
economists use the notion of the core to impose discipline on bargaining outcomes. The core of an
economy is the set of allocations (redistribution of goods among agents) that no subset, or coalition,
of agents can improve upon via re-trading among themselves. In other words, the core comprises
the outcomes that are not “blocked” by any coalition of agents. Any allocation that is not in the core
would be renegotiated, or re-contracted, by some set of agents. Note that the definition of the core
involves all possible coalitions of agents, of all possible sizes.
The core convergence theorem states that in a large (in an asymptotic sense) economy any out-
come in the core, arrived at through seemingly indeterminate reallocations and bargaining, will, in
fact, be a Walrasian equilibrium. In other words, the core convergence theorem captures the meaning
of the Edgeworth conjecture, and supports the use of Walrasian equilibria and price-taking behavior
in large economies.
Edgeworth’s conjecturewas first formalized byDebreu and Scarf [DS63] as well as Aumann [Aum64].1
In our paper we shall follow Debreu and Scarf; Aumann’s model assumes a limit economy with a
continuum of agents, hence there is no scope in his model to address the questions we are interested
in.2 Debreu and Scarf consider a large economy with limited heterogeneity. Their idea, which goes back
to Edgeworth himself, is to postulate a finite number of agent types, say h, and then imagine a se-
quence of replica economies. The n-th replica of the economy has n identical copies of each type
of agent t ∈ [h]. Under standard assumptions, they show that, in the limit as n → ∞, the core of
the nth replica economy approaches the set of Walrasian equilibrium allocations. Note that, the core
convergence theorem not only requires n to be asymptotically large, but, to address the core, one has
to account for coalitions that are arbitrarily large, both in size and in number.
In contrast to the core, we focus on the κ-core: the set of allocations that cannot be blocked by
any coalition of size at most κ. In a large economy, it is unlikely that coalitions of arbitrary size can
function effectively. Even if a large coalition can effectively communicate among its members, they
would face significant hurdles in aggregating their preferences to achieve an outcome that is collec-
tively better for the members of the coalition. Think of Arrow’s theorem: preference aggregation is
known to be very problematic, and the size and number of all coalitions in a large economy makes
the problem even worse. The κ-core demands much less of the blocking coalitions, and seems to us
a more plausible solution concept than the core. In addition, the number of coalitions to check for is
much smaller in the κ-core than in the core (
(n
κ
)
with fixed κ, rather than 2n).
Our main result is that under benign assumptions on agents’ preferences, an allocation that is in
the κ-core must be an approximate equilibrium (an ε-Walrasian equilibrium). κ depends polynomi-
ally on the approximation guarantee and on the agent heterogeneity in the economy. Our result is
non-asymptotic; it holds for finite economies, as long as the number of agents, n, exceeds κ. We adopt
the model and the assumptions of Debreu and Scarf. In fact, to make our paper self-contained, their
1See [Hil74] and [And92] for reviews of the literature on core convergence.
2A “fractional” version in atomless economies is still possible, see [Sch72; Gro72; Vin72].
2
result is restated in Section 3.
We are not the first to prove a quantitative version of Edgeworth’s conjecture. The closest paper
to ours is Mas-Colell [MC79], who also exhibits a bound on the size of blocking coalitions needed for
core convergence.3 The main difference between Mas-Colell’s result and ours is that he considers an
average error as his approximation guarantee. He ensures that the average budget gap, where the
average is taken over all agents in the economy, is small. If we translate his results into our stronger
objective of a per-agent approximation guarantee, his result requires κ to be a function of n.4 Our
result will instead say that κ is O(1/ε2) (as long as n ≥ κ). We should emphasize that Mas-Colell’s
theorem requires substantially weaker assumptions than ours and does not rely on the Edgeworth-
Debreu-Scarf replica setting.
Our main theorem has important algorithmic consequences for the problem of deciding whether
an allocation can be supported as an approximate Walrasian equilibrium. Imagine a policy maker
who would like to install a given allocation using decentralized markets. The standard advise to
such a policy maker comes from the second welfare theorem, which says that any Pareto optimal
allocation can be obtained (given certain assumptions on the economy) as a Walrasian equilibrium,
using a system of taxes and subsidies to adjust all agents’ incomes. We study the same question as in
the second welfare theorem, but when the policy maker is unable to freely use taxes or subsidies.
Specifically, given an allocation in an exchange economy, we consider the problem of deciding
whether there exists prices that make the allocation an approximate Walrasian equilibrium. Our
main algorithmic result is to provide a polynomial-time algorithm that resolves the question. Our
finding stands in stark contrast to the existing hardness results for Walrasian equilibria, see, for ex-
ample, [CDDT09; CSVY06; VY10; GMVY17]. There are settings for which it is known that finding an
equilibrium is hard, and for which our algorithm efficiently decides whether a given allocation can
be supported as an approximate Walrasian equilibrium.
We are, to the best of our knowledge, the first to study the question of “testing” a putative equi-
librium allocation. That is, without use of taxes and subsidies, and thus outside of the second welfare
theorem framework. Our paper resolves this question with a satisfactory algorithm.
1.1 Informal statement of our results
Our paper makes an economic and an algorithmic contribution. The economic contribution is in
the form of a non-asymptotic core convergence theorem, for a weakened notion of the core: one
that only requires robustness to blocks by small coalitions. The algorithmic contribution is to the
problem of testing whether an allocation is a (approximate) Walrasian equilibrium allocation. The
main lemma in our core convergence result allows us to develop an efficient algorithm that decides
whether an allocation can be supported as an approximate Walrasian equilibrium (and find the sup-
porting/equilibrium prices, if they exist).
The κ-core is the set of allocations that are not blocked by coalitions of size at most κ. We show
that core convergence is obtained as long as κ is polynomially large (in the approximation parameter
3Mas-Colell’s result builds on techniques due to Anderson [And78]. Anderson’s theorem, however, does not bound the
size of the blocking coalitions, and hence does not speak to the κ-core. His result connects the size (and other parameters)
of the economy with the approximation guarantee.
4Per-agent approximation guarantees are the focus of modern results in algorithmic game theory. In the terminology of
Anderson’s survey [And92] it reflects uniform convergence (what he terms U3), and it is rare in the older literature on core
convergence, even for results that rely on the power of all coalitions.
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and agent heterogeneity) and the size of the economy is at least κ. Thus, core convergence is obtained
in finite economies.
Specifically, we prove that in any replica economy with well-behaved utilities, allocations in the
κ-core are, in fact, ε-Walrasian, as long as κ is O
(
h2ℓ
ε2
)
; here, h denotes the heterogeneity of the
economy (i.e., the number of different types of agents), ℓ denotes the number of goods, and ε > 0 is
the approximation parameter; see Theorem 3.2. Note that our result does not require the number of
agents n, or the size of blocking coalitions, to be arbitrarily large. The result is applicable whenever
n is Ω(κ).
Our work develops new techniques for addressing core convergence. Instead of relying on limit-
ing, or measure-theoretic, arguments as in the classical literature (see [Hil74]), our proof builds upon
geometric insights and dimension-free results. Specifically, we employ the approximate version of
Carathéodory’s theorem (see [Bar15] and references therein). The classical theorem of Debreu and
Scarf requires a “rounding to rational numbers” argument–the size of the economy needs to be arbi-
trarily large so that such a rounding is possible. Our proof avoids such a rounding by invoking the
approximate Carathéodory theorem. In this manner, we ascertain that the largest coalitions needed
to ensure an approximate Walrasian equilibrium are only polynomially large and independent of the
size of the economy.
Our key technical insight is provided through an efficiently implementable characterization of
approximate Walrasian equilibrium allocations (see Lemma 3.3 in Section 3.1). Our characterization
yields, not only a quantitive version of core convergence, but also an efficient algorithm that tests
whether a given allocation can be supported as an approximate equilibrium.
Our algorithm takes as input an allocation, and determineswhether there are prices that make the
allocation into an approximate Walrasian equilibrium. This result is potentially useful to understand
the policy objectives that can be obtained in a descentralized fashion, as a Walrasian equilibrium. It
also contributes to the algorithmic literature on equilibrium computation, as it identifies a notable
dichotomy between testing and computing Walrasian equilibria.
The problem of computingWalrasian equilibria has been studied extensively in algorithmic game
theory. Most results in this direction are negative: finding aWalrasian equilibrium is computationally
hard for general settings; see, e.g., [CDDT09; CSVY06; VY10; GMVY17]. By contrast, we show that the
testing counterpart is computationally tractable. In particular, we develop a polynomial-time algo-
rithm that, for a given allocation, finds prices (if they exist) that make the allocation an approximate
Walrasian equilibrium (Theorem 4.2).5
The above-mentioned results require the utilities in the economy to be strongly concave. Hence,
as is, they do not address piecewise-linear concave (PLC) utilities, which, while concave, are not
strongly concave. The PLC case is particularly important in light of the hardness results in [DD08;
CDDT09; GMVY17]. However, we show that the developed ideas can be adapted to obtain an effi-
cient testing algorithm even for PLC economies (Theorem 4.5).
5Note that, in particular settings, it might be possible to efficiently test if a given allocation is Pareto optimal and, hence
(using the characterization provided by the welfare theorems), determine whether the allocation can be supported as an
exact equilibrium. However, in and of itself, this observation does not extend to approximate equilibria. Furthermore, it
does not directly lead to an efficient method for finding the supporting, equilibrium prices.
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2 Notation and Preliminaries
Notational Conventions. For vectors x, y ∈ Rℓ, write x ≤ y iff xi ≤ yi for all i ∈ [ℓ]. Also,
x ≪ y denotes that xi < yi for all i ∈ [ℓ]. We will use ∆ to refer to the standard simplex in Rℓ,
∆ :=
{
x ∈ Rℓ |∑ℓi=1 xi = 1 and xi ≥ 0 for all i}. The convex hull of a set of vectors A ∈ Rℓ will be
denoted by cvh(A). In addition, the all-ones and all-zeros vector will be denoted by 1 and 0, respec-
tively.
Exchange economies. An exchange economy E comprises of a set of consumers, [h] := {1, 2, . . . , h},
and a set of goods, [ℓ] := {1, 2, . . . , ℓ}. Each consumer is endowed with different quantities of the
goods as an endowment; specifically, for every consumer i ∈ [h], the vector ωi ∈ Rℓ+ denotes (compo-
nentwise) the amount of each good endowed to i. The preference of consumer i ∈ [h], over bundles
of goods, is specified by a utility function, ui : R
ℓ
+ 7→ R. In particular, every consumer is described
by a pair (ui, ωi). An exchange economy E is a tuple ((ui, ωi))hi=1.
We shall adopt some standard assumptions on consumers’ utilities: uis are continuous andmono-
tone increasing. We further assume that the utilities are continuously differentiable6 and α-strongly
concave, with α > 0. Strong concavity (convexity) is a well-studied property in convex optimization
(see, for example, [BV04]). It provides a parametric strengthening of concavity. Formally, a differen-
tiable function, u : Rℓ 7→ R, is said to be α-strongly concave within a set R ⊂ Rℓ iff the following
inequality holds for all x, y ∈ R:
u(y) ≤ u(x) +∇u(x)T (y − x)− α
2
‖y − x‖2.
Here, ∇u(x) is the gradient of the function u at point x and ‖ · ‖ denotes the Euclidean norm. Note
that if α = 0, then u is simply a concave function. Furthermore, the case of α > 0 corresponds to strict
concavity.
The setR specifies the subdomain over which strong concavity holds. We assume thatR is appro-
priately large and, in particular, that it contains the Euclidean ball of radius r ∈ R+ and center ωi (the
endowment vector), for each i. We assume that the radius r satisfies αr2 ≥ 2ελℓh + 2, with ε > 0 being
the approximation parameter and λ denoting the Lipschitz constant of the utilities. At a high level,
the condition asserts that agent i’s utility function has sufficient curvature close to i’s endowment
ωi. The strong concavity assumption is satisfied by standard examples of utility functions used in
economics; in particular, utilities of the form u(y) := (
∑ℓ
i=1 y
ρ
i ), with 0 < ρ < 1—i.e., utilities within
the CES (constant elasticity of substitution) family of utilities—are strongly concave; see Appendix B
for an illustrative example. Throughout, for ease of presentation, we will simply say that the utilities
are α-strongly concave, with the setR being implicit.
Core. For an exchange economy with h consumers and ℓ goods, E = ((ui, ωi))hi=1, we define the
following central constructs
• An allocation in E is a vector, x = (xi)hi=1 ∈ Rhℓ+ , such that
∑h
i=1 xi =
∑h
i=1 ωi. In other words, an
allocation corresponds to a redistribution of the endowments among the consumers.
6This additional smoothness assumption is primarily for ease of exposition. One can extend the arguments developed
in this work to continuous functions by replacing gradients with subgradients.
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• A nonempty subset S ⊆ [h] is a coalition. Let S be a coalition, then a vector (yi)i∈S is an S-
allocation if
∑
i∈S yi =
∑
i∈S ωi.
• A coalition S blocks the allocation x = (xi)hi=1 in E if there exists an S-allocation (yi)i∈S such that
ui(yi) > u(xi) for all i ∈ S. That is, a blocking coalition is a group of consumers that are better
off trading among themselves, than they would have been under x.
• The core of E is the set of all allocations that are not blocked by any coalition.
• The κ-core of E , for κ ∈ Z+, is the set of allocations that are not blocked by any coalition of
cardinality at most κ. Hence, in an economy with n consumers, the core is the n-core and the
set of individually rational allocations are the 1-core.
Equilibrium and approximate equilibrium. In an exchange economy E = ((ui, ωi))i∈[h], aWalrasian
equilibrium is a pair (p, x) ∈ Rℓ+ × Rhℓ+ in which
1. p ∈ Rℓ+ is a price vector for the ℓ goods in the economy.
2. x = (xi)i∈[h] ∈ Rhℓ+ is an allocation, i.e., under x supply equals the demand,
∑h
i=1 xi =
∑h
i=1 ωi.
3. Every consumer i ∈ [h] maximizes its utility ui, while consuming its endowment ωi. That
is, pTxi = p
Tωi and, for all bundles y ∈ Rℓ+ with the property that ui(y) > ui(xi), we have
pT yi > p
Tωi.
Next, we describe what we mean by an approximate Walrasian equilibrium. We use a notion
of approximation in which consumers are optimizing exactly, subject to budget constraints that are
satisfied approximately.
Formally, in an exchange economy E = ((ui, ωi))i∈[h], ε-Walrasian equilibrium is a pair (p, x) ∈
R
ℓ
+×Rhℓ+ in which the (normalized) price vector p ∈ ∆ and the allocation x ∈ Rhℓ+ satisfy the following
two conditions, for all consumers i ∈ [h]:
(i) |pTxi − pTωi| ≤ ε and
(ii) for any bundle y ∈ Rℓ+, with the property that ui(y) > ui(xi), we have pTy > pTωi − ε/h.
Our notion of approximation is different from the standard use in algorithmic game theory, where
agents are approximately optimizing, but it conforms to the most used definitions in economic the-
ory: see [Sta69; AH71; HSZ73; Hil74; And78; And82; AKR82; MC78; MC79]. Economists do not view
utilities as objective, observable, entities. Hence it is natural in economics to measure the approxima-
tion error in monetary terms, using consumers’ expenditure, instead of measuring approximation in
terms of utility loss.
That said, it is straightforward to move between different notions of approximate equilibrium,
and our result continues to apply. One can, instead, require that the approximation guarantee be in
terms of the utilities. Or that budget exhaustion holds exactly (so the value of agents’ consumption
equals the value of their endowment), but the overall supply is only approximately equal to the de-
mand. In Appendix A we show that one can obtain these kinds of approximations as well from the
results in this present paper.
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Walrasian allocation. The term (approximate) Walrasian allocation refers to an allocation x ∈ Rhℓ+ in E
for which there exists a price vector p ∈ ∆ such that (p, x) is a (approximate) Walrasian equilibrium.
Utility normalization. Our work addresses additive approximations, hence, we will follow the stan-
dard assumption (used in the context of absolute-error bounds) that the utilities are normalized so
that ui(xi) ∈ [0, 1) for all consumers i ∈ [h] and all allocations (xi)i ∈ Rhℓ+ . In fact, we shall nor-
malize then so that ui(xi) ∈ [0, 1 − η¯), where η¯ ∈ (0, 1) for all consumers i ∈ [h] and all allocations
(xi)i ∈ Rhℓ+ . These normalizations are possible as the set of all allocations is compact and, hence, each
utility function will achieve a maximum over the space of allocations.
Note that the utilities are normalized only for feasible allocations in the underlying exchange
economy. A bundle which is, say, component-wise greater than the total endowment in the exchange
economy—or, allocations in a replica economy (defined below)—can have utility arbitrarily greater
than one.
Also, we will use λ to denote the Lipschitz constant of the utility functions, uis.
Replica Economies. Let E = ((ui, ωi))i∈[h] be an exchange economy over the commodity space Rℓ+.
The n-th replica of E , for n ≥ 1, is the exchange economy En = ((ui,t, ωi,t))i∈[n],t∈[h], with nh consumers.
In En the consumers are indexed by (i, t), with index i ∈ [n] and type t ∈ [h], and they satisfy:
ui,t = ut and ωi,t = ωt.
Replica economies constitute the basic model of a large economy with limited heterogeneity. See
[MCWG+95, Chapter 18] for a textbook treatment.7
As mentioned previously, the utility normalization is considered only with respect to feasible al-
locations in the underlying economy E .8 Indeed, the consumers’ utilities scale up for feasible bundles
in En, since the amount of each good in the economy increases as a function of n.
An allocation x = (xi,t) of En is said to have the equal treatment property iff all the consumers with
the same type are allocated identical bundles, i.e., iff xi,t = xi′,t for every t ∈ [h] and i, i′ ∈ [n].
The following lemma is established in the work of Debreu and Scarf [DS63] and it asserts that
allocations contained in the h-core necessarily satisfy the equal treatment property. Debreu and Scarf
state the result as a consequence of the core, or, in the terminology of our paper, the (n×h)-core. In ac-
tuality, the stronger statement below holds true. We include a proof in Appendix C for completeness,
but the proof is really the same as that of Debreu and Scarf.
Lemma 2.1 (Equal treatment property). Let the utilities of each consumer be strictly monotonic, continuous,
and strictly concave in an exchange economy E = ((ui, ωi))i∈[h] and, hence, in the corresponding replica
economy En. Then, every h-core allocation of En satisfies the equal treatment property.
By Lemma 2.1, we can express the h-core allocations of En as vectors in Rhℓ+ ; with the convention
that consumers that have the same type receive the same bundle. This succinct representation also
applies to our main result, which considers κ-cores, with κ ≥ h. Hence, for brevity, we represent
7The idea of replicas was suggested by Edgeworth himself in his discussion of the competitive hypothesis in large
economies. He used X and Y to refer to two different agents, and wrote: “Let us now introduce a second X and a second
Y ; so that the field of competition consists of two Xs and two Ys. And for the sake of illustration (not of argument)
let us suppose that the new X has the same requirements, the same nature as the old X; and similarly that the new Y is
equal-natured with the old.” [Edg81].
8This, in particular, ensures that this normalization is compatible with the strict monotonicity of the utilities.
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κ-core allocations9 of the replica economy En as vectors in Rhℓ+ .
The definition of a Walrasian equilibrium (both, exact and approximate) naturally extends to
replica economies En, wherein the price vector p ∈ Rℓ+ and the allocation x ∈ Rnhℓ+ .
Furthermore, note that if (p, x) is a (approximate) Walrasian equilibrium in E , then p and an n-
times replicated version of x constitute a (approximate) Walrasian equilibrium in En. Analogously, if
x is a Walrasian allocation in E , then it10 is a Walrasian allocation in En as well, for all n ≥ 1.
Throughout, we will address allocations that satisfy the equal treatment property. Hence, we will
simply state that (p, x) ∈ Rℓ+ × Rhℓ+ is a (approximate) Walrasian equilibrium—or that x ∈ Rhℓ+ is a
(approximate) Walrasian allocation—without distinguishing between E and En in this context.
3 A Quantitative Core Convergence Theorem
“. . . the reason why the complex play of competition tends to a simple uniform result – what is
arbitrary and indeterminate in contract between individuals becoming extinct in the jostle of com-
petition – is to be sought in a principle which pervades all mathematics, the principle of limit, or
law of great numbers as it might perhaps be called.”
(Francis Ysidro Edgeworth [Edg84])
The following classic result of Debreu and Scarf [DS63] establishes that, as n tends to infinity, each
allocation in the core of En is a Walrasian allocation.
Theorem 3.1 (Debreu-Scarf Core Convergence Theorem). Assume that in an exchange economy E—with
h consumers and ℓ number of goods—the consumers’ utilities are strictly monotonic, continuous, and strictly
quasiconcave. Furthermore, suppose that an allocation x ∈ Rhℓ+ belongs to the core of En for all n ≥ 1. Then,
x is a Walrasian allocation, i.e., there exists a nonzero price vector p ∈ Rℓ+ such that (p, x) is a Walrasian
equilibrium.
By contrast, our result is nonasymptotic–it shows that as long as n is quadratic in h, ℓ, and 1/ε, a
core allocation is an ε-Walrasian allocation. In fact, our result holds for κ-cores, where κ is O
(
h2ℓ
ε2
)
.
Theorem 3.2 (Main Result). Assume that in an exchange economy E = ((ui, ωi))i∈[h]—with h consumers
and ℓ number of goods—the utilities, uis, are strictly monotonic, continuously differentiable, and α-strongly
concave. Furthermore, suppose that an allocation x ∈ Rhℓ+ belongs to the κ-core of En, for any
n ≥ κ ≥ 16
α
(
λℓh
ε
+
h2
ε2
)
.
Then, x is an ε-Walrasian allocation (i.e., there exists a price vector p ∈ ∆ such that (p, x) is an ε-Walrasian
equilibrium). Here, ε > 0 is the approximation parameter and λ is the Lipschitz constant of the utilities.
We will establish this theorem by showing that if an allocation x is in the κ-core, then there exists
a price vector p ∈ ∆ such that (p, x) is a ε-Walrasian equilibrium. It is relevant to note that, in-
stead of relying on limiting arguments, we use nonasymptotic results (with relevant approximation
9Note that in En an arbitrary allocation (say, one that does not satisfy equal treatment) is, in fact, a vector in Rnhℓ+ .
10Specifically, a replicated version of x
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guarantees), such as the approximate version of Carathéodory’s theorem (see [Bar15] and references
therein). Developing such a proof ensures that the underlying parameters (e.g., the core size κ) are
only polynomially large (and not arbitrarily large). This approach not only provides us with a quan-
titive version of the core convergence theorem, but also an efficiently implementable characterization
(Section 3.1). In Section 4 we will use the developed characterization to design an efficient algorithm
that tests whether a given allocation is approximately Walrasian, or not.
We will begin by establishing (in Section 3.1) a useful geometric property that is satisfied by all
allocations (Walrasian or otherwise). At a high level, this property shows that one can focus on
a bounded subset of a specific convex hull, which in itself is unbounded. This bounding exercise
essentially enables us to bypass asymptotic arguments, and prove the quantitative version of the
core convergence theorem in Section 3.3.
The fact that we can work with a bounded set (and not an unbounded one) is also essential
from an algorithmic standpoint. Specifically, it lets us apply the Ellipsoid method and develop (in
Section 4) an efficient, testing algorithm for Walrasian allocations.
3.1 Bounded Hull
The result developed in this section applies to arbitrary allocations; allocations that might or might
not be in the core. Consider an exchange economy E = ((ui, ωi))i∈[h]—with h consumers and ℓ
goods—in which the utilities, uis, are strictly monotonic, continuously differentiable, and α-strongly
concave. As before, λ denotes the Lipschitz constant of the utility functions. Let δ := ε/h.
Let y = (yi)i∈[h] be an allocation in E . With parameter η ∈ (0, 1), for each consumer i ∈ [h]
we define V ηi :=
{
y ∈ Rℓ+ | ui(y) ≥ ui(yi) + η
}
to denote the upper contour set with respect to the
allocated bundle yi and margin η. Also, write Q
η
i to denote the set of trades from the endowment ωi
that render consumer i better off than the allocated bundle, Qηi :=
{
z ∈ Rℓ | ui(z + ωi) ≥ ui(yi) + η
}
.
By definition, z ∈ Qηi iff (z + ωi) ∈ V ηi .
For each consumer i, we also consider Q̂ηi , a bounded subset of Q
η
i ; specifically,
Q̂ηi := Q
η
i ∩
{
z ∈ Rℓ : ‖z‖ ≤
√
2(λℓδ + 1)
α
}
,
The set Q̂ηi is obtained by intersecting Q
η
i with the Euclidean ball of radius
√
2(λℓδ+1)
α and center
0.
Since the utility ui is continuous and concave, the setQ
η
i is closed and convex. Therefore, the sub-
set Q̂ηi is compact (closed and bounded) and convex. The following lemma shows that, by bounding
the sets in this manner, we do not not loose out on an important containment property.
Lemma 3.3. Let y be an allocation in an economy E with strictly monotonic, continuously differentiable, and
strongly concave utilities. Suppose that the sets Qηi and Q̂
η
i , for i ∈ [h], are as defined above, with parameters
δ > 0 and η ∈ [0, η¯). Then,
(−δ)1 ∈ cvh
(
h⋃
i=1
Qηi
)
iff (−δ)1 ∈ cvh
(
h⋃
i=1
Q̂ηi
)
.
Proof. The reverse direction of the claim is direct, since Q̂ηi ⊂ Qηi for all i ∈ [h].
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For the forward direction, we have vectors zi ∈ Qηi and a convex combination λi ≥ 0, for i ∈ [h],
such that
∑h
i=1 λi = 1 and
h∑
i=1
λizi = (−δ)1 (1)
Let R := maxi{‖zi‖ : i ∈ [h]}. By definition, the zis are contained in the (closed) Euclidean ball
B(R) of radiusR and center 0. Note that, for each i ∈ [h], the intersectionQηi ∩B(R) is a compact set.
Let Z denote the collection of all tuples
(z′1, z
′
2, . . . , z
′
h) ∈ (Qη1 ∩B(R))× (Qη2 ∩B(R))× . . .×
(
Qηh ∩B(R)
)
for which there exists exists convex coefficients λ′is such that
∑
i λ
′
iz
′
i ≤ (−δ)1, i.e., there exists a
convex combination of z′is which is component-wise upper bounded by (−δ)1.11
From (1), we know that Z is nonempty. Given that the sets (Qηi ∩ B(R))s are compact, one can
show that Z is compact as well. Hence, the problem of minimizing max {‖z′i − (−δ)1‖ | (z′i)i ∈ Z}
admits an optimal solution, say (z∗t )t. Note that, by definition of Z , there exists convex coefficients
(λ∗t )t∈H∗ that satisfy
∑
t∈H∗ λ
∗
t z
∗
t ≤ (−δ)1; here, subset H∗ ⊆ [h] is selected to ensure that λ∗t > 0 for
all t ∈ H∗.
Next, we will prove that ‖z∗t ‖ ≤
√
2(λℓδ+1)
α , for all t ∈ H∗. Subsequently, we will show that using
z∗t s we can obtain vectors z˜t ∈ Qηt that satisfy the same norm bound (‖z˜t‖ ≤
√
2(λℓδ+1)
α ) and whose
convex combination is equal to (−δ)1. This norm bound implies that z˜t ∈ Q̂ηt and, hence, leads to the
desired containment: (−δ)1 ∈ cvh
(⋃h
i=1 Q̂
η
i
)
.
Assume, by way of contradiction, that ‖z∗i ‖ >
√
2(λℓδ+1)
α , for some i ∈ H∗. For such an i, consider
bundle x∗i := z
∗
i +ωi. By definition, z
∗
i ∈ Qηi and, hence, x∗i ∈ V ηi (i.e., x∗i belongs to the upper contour
set). Given that ui is α-strongly concave, we have
12
ui(ωi) ≤ ui(x∗i ) +∇ui(x∗i )T (ωi − x∗i )−
α
2
‖ωi − x∗i ‖2 (2)
Since ‖ωi − x∗i ‖ = ‖z∗i ‖ >
√
2(λℓδ+1)
α , inequality (2) reduces to
∇ui(x∗i )Tx∗i < ∇ui(x∗i )Tωi + (ui(x∗i )− ui(ωi))−
α
2
2(λℓδ + 1)
α
(3)
Now observe that x∗i must satisfy ui(x
∗
i ) = ui(y¯i) + η < 1: if this is not the case (i.e., we have
ui(x
∗
i ) > ui(y¯i) + η), then by reducing a positive component
13 of z∗i = x
∗
i − ωi we can ensure that z∗i
11The definition of Qηi s provide a component-wise lower bound as well: zi ≥ −ωi, for each vector zi ∈ Q
η
i .
12Note that, here the desired bound holds even if x∗i lies outside the range set R of strong concavity (see Section 2).
Specifically, we can consider a convex combination of ωi and x
∗
i , say vector x˜i, that is at a distance r (as specified in
Section 2) away from ωi. The assumption on R ensures that x˜i ∈ R and
αr2
2
≥ λδℓ + 1. Applying strong concavity
with x˜i we get ui(ωi) ≤ ui(x˜i) + ∇ui(x˜i)
T (ωi − x˜i) −
α
2
‖ωi − x˜i‖
2 ≤ ui(x˜i) + ∇ui(x˜i)
T (ωi − x˜i) − (λℓδ + 1). Since
ui(x
∗
i ) +∇ui(x
∗
i )
T (ωi − x
∗
i ) ≥ ui(x˜i) +∇ui(x˜i)
T (ωi − x˜i), inequality (3) follows.
13If all the components of z∗i are negative, then x
∗
i ≤ ωi and we get the desired bound ui(x
∗
i ) ≤ ui(ωi) ≤ 1 − η¯. Here,
the last inequality follows from the fact that the utility of any feasible allocation (and, hence, for ωi) is normalized to be at
most 1− η¯
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moves closer to (−δ)1 and at the same time z∗i continues to be in Qηi (i.e., the following inequality
continues to hold ui(x
∗
i ) ≥ ui(y¯i) + η). Also, note that such a reduction maintains the containment
of z∗i s in Z ; specifically, the following inequality continues to hold
∑
t λ
∗
t z
∗
t ≤ (−δ)1. A repeated
application of this argument gives us x∗i = z
∗
i + ωi with the property that ui(x
∗
i ) = ui(y¯i) + η < 1;
here, we have the last inequality since η < η¯.14
The utility function ui is λ-Lipschitz, hence, its gradient at any point x
∗
i ∈ Rℓ satisfies ‖∇ui(x∗i )‖∞ ≤
λ. That is, ‖∇ui(x∗i )‖1 ≤ λℓ. Therefore,
∇ui(x∗i )Tx∗i < ∇ui(x∗i )T (ωi + (−δ)1) (4)
Now, we can apply Proposition 3.4 (stated and proved below) with x = x∗i , w = (ωi+(−δ)1), and
inequality (4), to establish that there exists a positive µ ∈ (0, 1] such that ui(x∗i ) ≤ ui ((1− µ)x∗i + µ (ωi + (−δ)1)).
Rewriting, we get ui ((1− µ)(x∗i − ωi) + µ(−δ)1+ ωi) ≥ ui(x∗i ). Therefore,
ẑi := (1− µ)(x∗i − ωi) + µ(−δ)1 = (1− µ)z∗i + µ(−δ)1 ∈ Qηi ,
as x∗i ∈ V ηi and z∗i ∈ Qηi .
The vector ẑi is itself a convex combination of z
∗
i and (−δ)1. This ensures that there exists a convex
combination, (λ̂t)t∈H∗ , such that
λ̂iẑi +
∑
t∈H∗\{i}
λ̂tz
∗
t ≤ (−δ)1.
Note that ‖ẑi−(−δ)1‖ = (1−µ)‖z∗i −(−δ)1‖ < ‖z∗i −(−δ)1‖. This argument can be repeated for all
other js with ‖z∗j − (−δ)1‖ = max{‖z∗t − (−δ)1‖ | t ∈ H∗}, contradicting the definition (optimality)
of z∗t s.
Therefore, the desired upper bound on the norm holds: ‖z∗t ‖ ≤
√
2(λℓδ+1)
α , for all t ∈ H∗.
To complete the proof we will show that z∗t s can be transformed into vectors z˜t ∈ Qηt that satisfy
the same norm bound and whose convex combination is equal to (−δ)1. Write ϕ :=∑t λ∗t z∗t and note
that ϕ ≤ (−δ)1. If component a ∈ [ℓ] of ϕ is strictly less than−δ, then there exists a z∗i such that its ath
component is less than −δ as well: z∗i,a < −δ. We can increase z∗i,a till either it becomes equal to zero,
or the ath component of ϕ reaches −δ.15 Note that in this transformation while the ath component of
z∗i increases in value, it decreases in magnitude. Hence, the utility ui(z
∗
i +ωi) increases and the norm
of z∗i decreases. Repeatedly applying this procedure gives us vectors z˜t ∈ Qηt such that ‖z˜t‖ ≤ Λ and∑
t λ
∗
t z˜t = (−δ)1.
Overall, this implies that (−δ)1 ∈ cvh
(⋃h
i=1 Q˜i
)
and the stated claim follows.
The following observation was used in the proof of Lemma 3.3.
Proposition 3.4. For a continuously differentiable and concave function u : Rℓ 7→ R, let vector x,w ∈ Rℓ
satisfy the inequality ∇u(x)Tx < ∇u(x)Tw. Then, there exists a positive µ ∈ (0, 1] such that u(x) ≤
u ((1− µ)x+ µw).
Proof. Let ζ := ∇u(x)T (w − x) > 0. Also, for parameter µ ∈ (0, 1], denote by xµ the convex combina-
tion (1− µ)x+ µw. As µ tends to zero, xµ tends to x.
14Recall that the utility of any feasible allocation (and, hence, for yi) is normalized to be at most 1− η¯.
15Here, the convex coefficients, λ∗t s, remain unchanged.
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Given that u is concave,
u(x) ≤ u(xµ) +∇u(xµ)T (x− xµ)
= u(xµ)− µ∇u(xµ)T (w − x) (5)
The Cauchy-Schwarz inequality gives us |〈∇u(xµ) − ∇u(x), (w − x)〉| ≤ ‖∇u(xµ) − ∇u(x)‖ ·
‖w − x‖. Since u is continuously differentiable, there exists a small enough, but positive, µ such
that the right-hand-side of the previous inequality is strictly less than ζ . For such a µ > 0 we have
∇u(xµ)T (w − x) > 0. Therefore, using inequality (5), we get that there exists a µ ∈ (0, 1] for which
u(x) ≤ u ((1− µ)x+ µw).
3.2 Lemma for κ-Core Allocations
Recall the notation from Theorem 3.2 and write δ := εh along with γ :=
√
2(λℓδ+1)
α . Note that, in
Theorem 3.2, the lower bound on κ is equal to 8γ
2
δ2
.
In this section we apply Lemma 3.3 to establish an important separation property satisfied by
allocations in the κ-core of an economy. In contrast to the result developed in the previous section,
the next lemma (Lemma 3.5) specifically addresses κ-core allocations.
In particular, given a κ-core allocation x = (xi)i∈[h] ∈ Rhℓ+ , let η¯ > 0 be such that ui(xi) ∈ [0, 1 − η¯]
for all i ∈ [h]–the normalization of the utilities (to lie in [0, 1)) ensures that such a η¯ exists. Consider
an arbitrarily small, but positive, parameter η ∈ (0, η¯).
For each consumer i ∈ [h], write Uηi :=
{
x ∈ Rℓ+ | ui(x) ≥ ui(xi) + η
}
to denote the upper con-
tour set with respect to the allocated bundle xi and margin η. Also, write P
η
i to denote the set of
trades from the endowment ωi that render consumer i better off than the allocated bundle, P
η
i :={
z ∈ Rℓ | ui(z + ωi) ≥ ui(xi) + η
}
. By definition, z ∈ P ηi iff (z + ωi) ∈ Uηi .
The next lemma provides an important characterization in terms of the convex hull of the P ηi s.
This lemma shows that under a κ-core allocation beneficial trades (i.e., vectors in P ηi s) cannot be
combined (as a convex combination) across consumers to obtain (−δ)1; recall that δ := ε/h. At a high
level, this corresponds to the fact that, under a κ-core allocation, mutually beneficial redistributions
are not possible across consumers.
Lemma 3.5. For any allocation x = (xi)i∈[h] that belongs to the κ-core of an economy En, we have
(−δ) 1 /∈ cvh
(
h⋃
i=1
P ηi
)
.
Proof. Write ν := (−δ)1. Suppose, towards a contradiction, that ν ∈ cvh
(⋃h
i=1 P
η
i
)
. Then, applying
Lemma 3.3, we get that there exist vectors z∗t ∈ P ηt such that their norm is bounded, ‖z∗t ‖ ≤
√
2(λℓδ+1)
α ,
and their convex hull contains ν:
ν ∈ cvh (z∗t )t∈H∗
Here,H∗ is a subset of [h]with the property that all t inH∗ have strictly positive weight in the convex
combination that yields ν.
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Therefore, via the approximate version of Carathéodory’s theorem (see, in particular, Theorem 2
in [Bar15]), we get that, for any integer k ≥ 8γ2δ2 , there exists a vector ν ′ ∈ cvh (z∗t )t∈H∗ which is δ close
to ν (i.e., ‖ν ′ − ν‖ < δ) and it satisfies
ν ′ =
∑
t∈H∗
βt
k
z∗t ,
with integers βt ∈ Z+ summing up to k:
∑
t∈H∗ βt = k.
Choose an integer k ≥ 8γ2
δ2
with k ≤ κ. Then, ν ′ is δ-close to ν and it is a k-uniform convex
combination of the z∗t s. Given that the Euclidean distance between ν ′ and ν = (−δ)1 is strictly
smaller than δ, the vector ν ′ is componentwise strictly negative: ν ′ ≪ 0.
Now, consider a coalition S in En defined by including βt ∈ Z+ copies of consumers of type
t ∈ H∗. Note that |S| = k ≤ κ.
For each member of S of type t, let consumption bundle y∗i,t := z
∗
t + ωt. Since z
∗
t ∈ P ηt , we have
ut(y
∗
i,t) ≥ ut(xt) + η for all (i, t) ∈ S.
Also, the fact that ν ′ is a k-uniform convex combination of the z∗t s gives us
1
k
 ∑
(i,t)∈S
y∗i,t −
∑
(i,t)∈S
ωt
 = ν ′ ≪ 0
Therefore,
∑
(i,t)∈S y
∗
i,t ≪
∑
(i,t)∈S ωt =
∑
(i,t)∈S ωi,t. As a consequence, the coalition S, which has
cardinality k ≤ κ, blocks the given allocation x = (xi)i∈[h], in the replica economy En. This contradicts
that x belongs to the κ-core of En.
3.3 Proof of Theorem 3.2
For the given κ-core allocation x = (xi)i∈[h] ∈ Rhℓ+ of the economy En, we have Uηi := {x ∈ Rℓ+ |
ui(x) ≥ ui(xi) + η} and P ηi := {z ∈ Rℓ | ui(z + ωi) ≥ ui(xi)}, for each i ∈ [h].
Lemma 3.5 guarantees that (−δ) 1 /∈ cvh
(⋃h
i=1 P
η
i
)
. Hence, there exists a hyperplane between
(−δ) 1 and the convex hull; an implication of the hyperplane separation theorem.
In particular, let p ∈ Rℓ specify such a separating hyperplane: p · ((−δ)1) ≤ p ·cvh
(⋃h
i=1 P
η
i
)
. The
upward closure of P ηi s (a consequence of strict monotonicity of the consumers’ utility functions), and
p 6= 0, ensures that p > 0. Hence, by scaling, we can assume that p ∈ ∆.
We will show that p—as a price vector—certifies that x is an ε-Walrasian allocation, i.e., (p, x) is
an ε-Walrasian equilibrium.
Recall that, in an exchange economy E = ((ui, ωi))i∈[h], a pair (q, y) ∈ ∆ × Rhℓ+ (with price vector
q and allocation y) is deemed to be an ε-Walrasian equilibrium iff the following two conditions hold
for every consumer i: (i) |qT yi − qTωi| ≤ ε and (ii) for any bundle x, with ui(x) > ui(yi), we have
qTx > qTωi − ε/h. To complete the proof, we will show that (p, x) satisfies these conditions.
Note that, for each i ∈ [h] and any z = (x− ωi) ∈ P ηi , the separation by p ∈ ∆ implies
pT (x− ωi) = pT z ≥ pT ((−δ)1) = −δ.
Hence, for any bundle x ∈ Uηi (i.e., for any bundle x that satisfies ui(x) ≥ ui(xi) + η) the expenditure
is at least the income (minus δ): pTx ≥ pTωi − δ; recall that δ = ε/h.
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Here, the analysis holds for any η > 0, however small. That is, for a bundle x ∈ Rℓ+, with the
property that, ui(x) > ui(xi), we have
pTx ≥ pTωi − δ (6)
Therefore, (p, x) satisfies the second condition in the definition of an ε-Walrasian equilibrium.
Finally, we will show that even under the allocated bundle xi, the expenditure is close to the
income. Using the continuity of the utilities and a small enough η, we can apply inequality (6) to
obtain pTxj ≥ pTωj − δ for all consumers j ∈ [h].
Allocation x = (xj)j∈[h] satisfies the equal treatment property (Lemma 2.1), hence
∑
j∈[h] xj =∑
j∈[h] ωj . Therefore, for each consumer i, we have (xi − ωi) =
∑
j∈[h]\{i}(ωj − xj). Taking inner
product with p ∈ ∆, we get that (p, x) satisfies the first condition in the definition of an ε-Walrasian
equilibrium as well:
pT (xi − ωi) =
∑
j∈[h]\{i}
pT (ωj − xj) ≤ (h− 1)δ < ε.
Overall, we get that (p, x) is an ε-Walrasian equilibrium and this completes the proof.
4 Testing Algorithm for Walrasian Allocations
This section develops a polynomial-time algorithm that efficiently determineswhether a given alloca-
tion is an ε-Walrasian allocation, or not. Specifically, given an exchange economy16 E = ((ui, ωi))i∈[h]—
with h consumers and ℓ goods—alongwith an allocation y = (yi)i∈[h] ∈ Rhℓ, the developed algorithm
efficiently finds a price vector p ∈ ∆ (if one exists) such that (p, y) is an ε-Walrasian equilibrium in
E . If no such price vector exists (i.e., y is not an ε-Walrasian allocation), then the algorithm correctly
reports as such.
The developed algorithm runs in time that is polynomial in the number of consumers h. The
algorithm applies, in particular, to completely heterogeneous economies, in which all the consumers
can be of different type. In other words, our algorithmic results are not confined to the replica-
economy framework.
The testing algorithm builds upon Lemma 3.3. As before, for any given allocation y = (yi)i∈[h]
(which might or might not be approximately Walrasian) and each consumer i ∈ [h], we define the set
Qi := {z ∈ Rℓ | ui(z+ωi) ≥ ui(yi)}.17 Wewill prove (in Lemma 4.1 below) that the (non) containment
of (−δ)1 in the convex hull of the Qis characterizes Walrasian equilibria; recall that δ := ε/h.
This geometric characterization is interesting in its own right. However, given that the setsQis are
unbounded, this characterization (in terms ofQis), does not, in and of itself, translate into an efficient
testing algorithm. Specifically, in order to apply the Ellipsoid method and test whether a vector is
contained in a specific convex set, one requires the set to be bounded. The quantitive treatment
developed in this paper—in particular, Lemma 3.3—enables us to bypass this issue. Specifically, we
will show that it suffices to work with the a bounded subset of Qi. Towards that end, we define
Q̂i := Qi ∩
{
z ∈ Rℓ : ‖z‖ ≤
√
2(λℓδ + 1)
α
}
(7)
16Our algorithm only requires oracle access to the underlying utilities uis and their gradients. In particular, our algorith-
mic result will hold even in the absence of an explicit (say, a closed form) description of the utility functions.
17That is, in terms of the notation developed in Section 3.1, we are considering Qηi with η = 0.
14
Here, α is the strong-concavity parameter of the utilities and λ is their Lipschitz constant.
As observed before, the setQi is closed and convex. Furthermore, the subset Q̂i is compact (closed
and bounded) and convex.18 Also, note that any vector z in Qi of norm less than
√
2(λℓδ+1)
α , belongs
to Q̂i as well.
Lemma 4.1. An allocation y is an ε-Walrasian allocation in an economy E iff
(−δ) 1 /∈ cvh
(
h⋃
i=1
Q̂i
)
.
Here, for each consumer i ∈ [h], the set Q̂i is as defined above.
Proof. First, we will consider the case wherein (−δ)1 ∈ cvh
(⋃h
i=1 Q̂i
)
and show that this contain-
ment implies that y is not an ε-Walrasian allocation. Then, we will address the complementary case
and prove that if (−δ)1 /∈ cvh
(⋃h
i=1 Q̂i
)
, then y is indeed an ε-Walrasian allocation.
The containment (−δ)1 ∈ cvh
(⋃h
i=1 Q̂i
)
implies that there exists vectors zi ∈ Q̂i ⊂ Qi, with
i ∈ [h], along with convex coefficients λis such that
∑
i λizi = (−δ)1. Here, λi ≥ 0, for all i, and∑
i λi = 1.
For each i, write xi = zi + ωi. Hence, we have∑
i
λi(xi − ωi) = (−δ)1 (8)
Furthermore, given that zi ∈ Qi, the definition of Qi implies ui(xi) ≥ ui(yi), for each i.
Say, towards a contradiction, that y is an ε-Walrasian allocation. That is, there exits a price vector
p ∈ ∆ such that (p, y) is a ε-Walrasian equilibrium. Taking inner product with p on both sides of the
equation (8), we obtain
∑
i λi p
T (xi−ωi) = −δ. Since λis are convex coefficients, there exists an index
j such that pTxj ≤ pTωj− δ.19 Since uj(xj) ≥ uj(yj), the inequalities contradict the fact (in particular,
contradict the second condition in the definition of an approximate Walrasian equilibrium) that (p, y)
is an ε-Walrasian equilibrium.
To complete the proof we now consider the complementary case: (−δ)1 /∈ cvh
(⋃h
i=1 Q̂i
)
. Using
Lemma 3.3 (in contrapositive form, with η = 0) we get (−δ)1 /∈ cvh
(⋃h
i=1Qi
)
.
Consider a hyperplane between (−δ)1 and this convex hull: p · ((−δ)1) ≤ p · cvh
(⋃h
i=1Qi
)
. The
hyperplane separation theorem guarantees the existence of such a p ∈ Rℓ. Since Qi is upward closed,
p is componentwise nonnegative. Therefore, and given that p 6= 0, by scaling we can assume that
p ∈ ∆. Next, we will show that (p, y) is an ε-Walrasian equilibrium.
For each consumer j ∈ [h] and any z ∈ Qj , consider the vector y = z + ωj . The definition of
Qj implies uj(y) ≥ uj(yj). The separating property of hyperplane p gives us pT (y − ωj) = pT z ≥
pT (−δ)1 = −δ. Therefore, for each j ∈ [h], the second condition in the definition of an approximate
Walrasian equilibrium is satisfied: for any y with the property that uj(y) > uj(yj)we have
pTy ≥ pTωj − δ (9)
18We can enlarge Q̂i to ensure that it always has a nonempty interior. For instance, we can set the the radius of the
intersecting Euclidean ball to be, say, max
{√
2(λℓδ+1)
α
, 2‖yi‖
}
; note that yi ∈ Qi and, hence, with this redefinition we
have yi ∈ Q̂i.
19With a slightly smaller value of δ we can directly obtain a strict inequality pTxj < p
Tωj − ε/h.
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Inequality (9) holds, in particular, for yjs: p
T yj ≥ pTωj−δ. In addition, given that y is an allocation
in the economy E we have that, under y, the supply is equal to the demand:∑hj=1 yj =∑hj=1 ωj .
Hence, for any fixed i, yi − ωi =
∑
j∈[h]\{i}(ωj − yj). Multiplying both sides of this equality with
pT we establish the first condition that defines an ε-Walrasian equilibrium:
pT (yi − ωi) =
∑
j∈[h]\{i}
pT (ωj − yj)
≤
∑
j∈[h]\{i}
δ (using (9) with y = yj)
= (h− 1)δ < ε
That is, |pT yi−pTωi| ≤ ε. Hence, (p, y) is an ε-Walrasian equilibrium and the stated claim follows.
In light of Lemma 4.1, testing whether an allocation y is approximately Walrasian, or not, reduces
to determining whether the vector (−δ)1 is contained in the convex hull of the Q̂is. Below, in Theo-
rem 4.2, we develop an efficient separation oracle for the convex hull of the Q̂is–the testing algorithm
is obtained by simply applying this separation oracle onto (−δ)1.
For designing the efficient oracle, we use the equivalence of optimization and separation [GLS12].
We show that (linear) optimization problems can be solved in polynomial time over the convex hull
of the Q̂is. Therefore, we obtain the desired separation oracle. Note that this is a somewhat atypical
application of the optimization-separation equivalence–we start with an optimization algorithm to
obtain a separating one.
The running time of our algorithm is polynomial in the input size; in particular, the running time
is polynomial in the bit complexity of the underlying parameters (including ε). Furthermore, the
algorithm only requires oracle access to the utilities and their gradients.
Theorem 4.2 (Testing Algorithm). Let E be an exchange economy with monotonic, continuously differen-
tiable, and strongly concave utilities. Then, there exists a polynomial-time algorithm that, given an allocation
y in E , determines whether y is an ε-Walrasian allocation.
Proof. As a direct consequence of Lemma 4.1 we have: testing for approximatelyWalrasian allocation
corresponds to determining whether the vector (−δ)1 is contained in the convex hull of the Q̂is; see
equation (7) for the definition of these sets.
Write Q̂ := cvh
(⋃h
i=1 Q̂i
)
. We will develop an efficient algorithm, ALG, for solving linear opti-
mization problems over Q̂, i.e., for solving problems of the form
max cT z subject to z ∈ Q̂ (10)
Here, c ∈ Rℓ is an input vector.
The equivalence of optimization and separation (see, e.g., [GLS12]) implies that ALG can be used
to design a polynomial-time algorithm SEP that provides a separation oracle for Q̂. That is, using SEP
we can perform the desired test of determining whether (−δ)1 ∈ Q̂, or not.
In order to apply the optimization-separation equivalence we need to ensure that Q̂ is compact,
convex, and has a nonempty interior. These properties are satisfied by Q̂is individually, hence they
16
hold for Q̂ as well. Therefore, we can evoke the equivalence (via an application of the Ellipsoid
method over the polar of Q̂) and obtain the algorithm SEP.
To develop the algorithm, ALG, that efficiently solves linear optimization problems of the form
(10), we note that the feasible set Q̂ is a convex hull of the Q̂is. Hence, for any c ∈ Rℓ, an optimal
solution of (10) can be obtained by solving
max
i∈[h]
(
max cT zi subject to zi ∈ Q̂i
)
(11)
Here, for each i, the decision variable zi ∈ Rℓ lies in the set Q̂i. Below we will provide, for each i,
a polynomial-time algorithm, ALGi, that solves the linear optimization problem over Q̂i, i.e., ALGi
efficiently solves max cT zi subject to zi ∈ Q̂i. Hence, ALG can be obtained by directly taking a
maximum over the (optimal) solutions obtained by the ALGis.
We will now complete the chain of arguments mentioned above by designing the optimization
algorithm ALGi. This algorithm is itself based on the Ellipsoid method. As detailed below, the gradi-
ents of the utility function ui (at different points) can be used to separate Q̂i from vectors that are not
contained in it. Hence, with this separation technique in hand, we can apply the Ellipsoid method
over Q̂i to obtain ALGi.
20
Given a query vector q ∈ Rℓ, it is easy to test if q ∈ Q̂i := Qi ∩
{
z ∈ Rℓ : ‖z‖ ≤
√
2(λℓδ+1)
α
}
. We
directly verify (i) ui(q + ωi) ≥ ui(yi) (to ensure that q ∈ Qi) and (ii) ‖q‖ ≤
√
2(λℓδ+1)
α .
Consider the case in which q /∈ Q̂i. To run the Ellipsoid method (that underlies ALGi), we need a
separating hyperplane for such a q ∈ Rℓ. There are two complementary (though, nonexclusive) cases
either (i) q /∈ Qi (i.e., ui(q + ωi) < ui(yi)) and (ii) ‖q‖ >
√
2(λℓδ+1)
α .
In case (i), the gradient at q+ωi (i.e.,∇ui(q+ωi) ∈ Rℓ+) provides the separating hyperplane: utility
ui is concave, hence ui(z+ωi) ≤ ui(q+ωi)+∇ui(q+ωi)T (z+ωi− q−ωi), for any z ∈ Rℓ. Specifically,
if z ∈ Qi, then ui(z+ωi) ≥ ui(yi) > ui(q+ωi). Using the previous two inequalities we get the desired
separation, via π := ∇ui(q + ωi)
πT q < πT z for all z ∈ Q̂i ⊂ Qi.
In case (ii), the vector π := − qγ‖q‖ suffices; here γ =
√
2(λℓδ+1)
α . Note that
πT q = −‖q‖
γ
< −1 (12)
For any z ∈ Q̂i we have ‖z‖ ≤ γ. Now, the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality gives us |πT z| ≤ ‖π‖‖z‖ =
1
γ ‖z‖ ≤ 1. This inequality along with (19) shows that π is indeed a separating hyperplane: πT q < πT z
for all z ∈ Q̂i.
Overall, we observe that separation with respect to the Q̂is can be performed efficiently. Hence,
via the Ellipsoid method, we obtain, for each i, the algorithm ALGi that optimizes over Q̂i.
Combining ALGis we get the optimization algorithm (over Q̂) ALG, which, in turn, leads to SEP
(the desired algorithm that separates with respect to Q̂).
20Recall that, Q̂is are compact, convex, and have a nonempty interior. Hence, the Ellipsoid method is applicable over
these sets.
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Remark 4.1. The proof of Theorem 4.2 shows that if allocation y is an ε-Walrasian allocation, then the
hyperplane separating the vector ν := (−δ)1 from Q := cvh (∪iQi) provides the equilibrium prices
p ∈ ∆. That is, if vector p ∈ ∆ satisfies p · ν ≤ p · Q, then (p, y) is an ε-Walrasian equilibrium. Note
that such a price vector can be obtained by considering PQ(ν) ∈ Q, the projection (under Euclidean
distance) of ν ontoQ. In particular, via the variational characterization of convex projections, we have
(z−PQ(ν))T (ν−PQ(ν)) ≤ 0 for all z ∈ Q. That is, (PQ(ν)−ν)T z ≥ (PQ(ν)−ν)TPQ(ν) ≥ (PQ(ν)−ν)T ν
for all z ∈ Q. Hence, with p = PQ(ν)−ν‖PQ(ν)−ν‖1 , we get the desired separation.
The norm of PQ(ν) is polynomially bounded: note that ‖PQ(ν) − ν‖ ≤ mini ‖yi − ν‖, since
yi ∈ Q. Another relevant observation is that Lemma 3.3 is not confined to (−δ)1–we can establish
such a containment result for any vector q ∈ Rℓ as long as we take obtain Q̂is by intersectionQis with
a large enough ball. The radius of the ball just has to be polynomially large in ‖q‖. Hence, with large
enough Q̂is, we can ensure that PQ(ν) ∈ Q̂ := cvh
(
∪iQ̂i
)
.
Additionally, the set containment Q̂ ⊂ Q implies the projection of ν onto Q̂, say PQ̂(ν) ∈ Rℓ, is
the same as the desired vector PQ(ν).
In the proof of Theorem 4.2 we have developed a polynomial-time separation oracle for Q̂. There-
fore, via the Ellipsoid method, the projection PQ̂(ν) can be computed efficiently and, hence, we can
find the equilibrium prices p =
PQ̂(ν)−ν
‖PQ̂(ν)−ν‖1
.
4.1 Testing Algorithm for Economies with Piecewise-Linear Concave Utilities
In this section we consider economies, E = ((ui, ωi))i∈[h], in which consumers’ utilities are piecewise-
linear concave (PLC). In this PLC setting, for every agent, the utility of each consumption bundle is
obtained by taking a minimum over a set of linear functions. Specifically, PLC utilities have the form
ui(x) := mink
{∑
j U
k
i,jxj + T
k
i
}
, here xj is the amount of good j in the consumption bundle x ∈ Rℓ+
and the nonnegative parameters Uki,j ∈ R+ and T ki ∈ R+ define the kth linear function for agent i.
These parameters are given as input to specify each agent’s utility.
While PLC utilities are concave, they are not strongly concave. Hence, under PLC utilities, one
cannot directly apply Theorem 4.2. However, we show that the ideas developed in the previous
section can be adapted to obtain a polynomial-time algorithm for testing whether a given allocation
is approximately Walrasian in a PLC economy. Finding equilibria (exact and approximate) is known
to computationally hard under PLC utilities [DD08; CDDT09; GMVY17]. Hence, the result in this
section identifies an interesting dichotomy between testing and finding a Walrasian equilibrium.
First, we will establish a containment result analogous to Lemma 3.3. Using this containment
result (and arguments similar to the ones developed in Theorem 4.2) we develop an efficient, testing
algorithm for PLC economies in Theorem 4.5.
In the PLC context, a key observation (established below in Lemma 4.3) is that the containment
property can be obtained by considering vectors of norm at most
Λ := max
i∈[h],x∈Rℓ+
{
‖x− ωi‖ : ui(x) ≤ ui
(∑
i
ωi
)}
(13)
Under PLC utilities, the bit complexity of Λ is polynomially bounded: specifically, for any con-
sumption bundle x ∈ Rℓ+, with the property ui(x) ≤ ui (
∑
i ωi), we have, for each component a ∈ [ℓ],
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xa ≤ ui(
∑
i ωi)
mink U
k
i,a
≤ ui(
∑
i ωi)
mink,j U
k
i,j
.21 The bit complexity of this upper bound is polynomially large and,
hence, Λ is also polynomially upper bounded, in terms of bit complexity.
Note that, this bound does not require the utilities to be normalized. In fact, the results developed
in this section hold for any exchange economy wherein the utilities are concave and Λ (as defined in
(13)) is appropriately bounded.
For any given allocation y = (yi)i∈[h], consider the bundle yi ∈ Rℓ allocated to consumer i and, as
before, write Qi := {z ∈ Rℓ | z + ωi ∈ Rℓ+ and ui(z + ωi) ≥ ui(yi)}. In addition, we define a bounded
subset of Qi
Q˜i := Qi ∩
{
z ∈ Rℓ | ‖z‖ ≤ Λ
}
(14)
For each consumer i, the subset Q˜i is compact, convex, and has a nonempty interior.
Lemma 4.3. Let y be an allocation in an exchange economy E with PLC utilities. Suppose that the sets Qi and
Q˜i, for i ∈ [h], are as defined above. Then, with parameter δ > 0, we have
(−δ)1 ∈ cvh
(
h⋃
i=1
Qi
)
iff (−δ)1 ∈ cvh
(
h⋃
i=1
Q˜i
)
.
Proof. The proof of this claim is almost identical to that of Lemma 3.3–the difference being that here
we use the bound provided by Λ, instead of relying on strong concavity.
To begin with, note that the reverse direction of the claim is direct, since Q˜i ⊂ Qi for all i ∈ [h].
For the forward direction, we have vectors zi ∈ Qi and a convex combination λi ≥ 0, for i ∈ [h],
such that
∑h
i=1 λi = 1 and
h∑
i=1
λizi = (−δ)1 (15)
Let R := maxi{‖zi‖ : i ∈ [h]}. By definition, the zis are contained in the (closed) Euclidean ball
B(R) of radius R and center 0. Note that, for each i ∈ [h], the intersectionQi ∩B(R) is a compact set.
Let Z denote the collection of all tuples
(z′1, z
′
2, . . . , z
′
h) ∈ (Q1 ∩B(R))× (Q2 ∩B(R))× . . .× (Qh ∩B(R))
for which there exists exists convex coefficients λ′is such that
∑
i λ
′
iz
′
i ≤ (−δ)1, i.e., there exists a
convex combination of z′is which is component-wise upper bounded by (−δ)1.22
From (15), we know that Z is nonempty. Given that the sets (Qi ∩ B(R))s are compact, one can
show that Z is compact as well. Hence, the problem of minimizing max {‖z′i − (−δ)1‖ | (z′i)i ∈ Z}
admits an optimal solution, say (z∗t )t. Note that, by definition of Z , there exists convex coefficients
(λ∗t )t∈H∗ that satisfy
∑
t∈H∗ λ
∗
t z
∗
t ≤ (−δ)1; here, subset H∗ ⊆ [h] is selected to ensure that λ∗t > 0 for
all t ∈ H∗.
Next, we will prove that ‖z∗t ‖ ≤ Λ, for all t ∈ H∗. Subsequently, we will show that using z∗t s
we can obtain vectors z˜t ∈ Qt that satisfy the same norm bound (‖z˜t‖ ≤ Λ) and whose convex
21We can address the case in which one of the nonnegative coefficients Uki,j is equal to zero. In particular, adapting the
arguments in Lemma 4.3 one can obtain xa ≤
ui(
∑
i ωi)
min
{k,j:Uk
i,j
6=0}
Uk
i,j
.
22The definition of Qis provide a component-wise lower bound as well: zi ≥ −ωi, for each vector zi ∈ Qi.
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combination is equal to (−δ)1. This norm bound implies that z˜t ∈ Q˜t and, hence, leads to the desired
containment: (−δ)1 ∈ cvh
(⋃h
i=1 Q˜i
)
.
The bundle x∗i := z
∗
i + ωi must satisfy ui(x
∗
i ) = ui(y¯i) ≤ ui(
∑
i ωi): if this is not the case (i.e., we
have a strict inequality ui(x
∗
i ) > ui(y¯i)), then by reducing a positive component
23 of z∗i = x
∗
i − ωi
we can ensure that z∗i moves closer to (−δ)1 and at the same time z∗i continues to be in Qi (i.e., the
following inequality continues to hold ui(x
∗
i ) ≥ ui(y¯i)). Also, note that such a reduction maintains
the containment of z∗i s in Z ; specifically, the following inequality continues to hold
∑
t λ
∗
t z
∗
t ≤ (−δ)1.
A repeated application of this argument gives us x∗i = z
∗
i +ωi with the property that ui(x
∗
i ) = ui(y¯i) ≤
ui (
∑
i ωi), for all i. Therefore, using the definition of Λ (see (13)), we obtain the stated bound ‖z∗i ‖ ≤
Λ.
To complete the proof we will show that z∗t s can be transformed into vectors z˜t ∈ Qt that satisfy
the same norm bound and whose convex combination is equal to (−δ)1. Write ϕ :=∑t λ∗t z∗t and note
that ϕ ≤ (−δ)1. If component a ∈ [ℓ] of ϕ is strictly less than −δ, then there exists a z∗i such that its
ath component is also less than−δ: z∗i,a < −δ. We can increase z∗i,a till either it becomes equal to zero,
or the ath component of ϕ reaches −δ.24 Note that in this transformation while the ath component of
z∗i increases in value, it decreases in magnitude. Hence, the utility ui(z
∗
i +ωi) increases and the norm
of z∗i decreases. Repeatedly applying this procedure gives us vectors z˜t ∈ Qt such that ‖z˜t‖ ≤ Λ and∑
t λ
∗
t z˜t = (−δ)1.
Overall, this implies that (−δ)1 ∈ cvh
(⋃h
i=1 Q˜i
)
and the stated claim follows.
Lemma 4.3 leads to the following characterization for approximate equilibria in PLC economies.
Lemma 4.4. An allocation y is an ε-Walrasian allocation in a PLC economy E iff
(−δ) 1 /∈ cvh
(
h⋃
i=1
Q˜i
)
.
Here, for each consumer i ∈ [h], the set Q˜i is as defined above.
The proof of this result is identical to that of Lemma 4.1 and is omitted; one has to simply use
Lemma 4.3, instead of Lemma 3.3.
We now establish the main result of this section.
Theorem 4.5. There exists a polynomial-time algorithm that—given an allocation y = (yi)i∈[n] in an ex-
change economy E = ((ui, ωi))i∈[n] with PLC utilities—determines whether y is an ε-Walrasian allocation, or
not.
Proof. The design of the testing algorithm for PLC utilities is quite similar to the method developed
in the proof of Theorem 4.2. We present the details for the PLC setting for completeness.
As a direct consequence of Lemma 4.4 we have: testing for approximately Walrasian allocation
corresponds to determining whether the vector (−δ)1 is contained in the convex hull of the Q˜is;
see (14) for the definition of these sets.
Write Q˜ := cvh
(⋃h
i=1 Q˜i
)
. We will develop an efficient algorithm, ALG, for solving linear opti-
mization problems over Q˜, i.e., for solving problems of the form
max cT z subject to z ∈ Q˜ (16)
23If all the components of z∗i are negative, then x
∗
i ≤ ωi and we get the desired bound ui(x
∗
i ) ≤ ui(ωi) ≤ ui(
∑
i ωi).
24Here, the convex coefficients, λ∗t s, remain unchanged.
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Here, c ∈ Rℓ is an input vector. The equivalence of optimization and separation (see, e.g., [GLS12])
implies that ALG can be used to design a polynomial-time algorithm SEP that provides a separation
oracle for Q˜. That is, using SEP we can perform the desired test of determining whether (−δ)1 ∈ Q˜,
or not.
In order to apply the optimization-separation equivalence we need to ensure that Q˜ is compact,
convex, and has a nonempty interior. These properties are satisfied by Q˜is individually, hence they
hold for Q˜ as well. Therefore, we can evoke the equivalence (via an application of the Ellipsoid
method over the polar of Q˜) and obtain the algorithm SEP.
To develop the algorithm, ALG, that efficiently solves linear optimization problems of the form
(16), we note that the feasible set Q˜ is a convex hull of the Q˜is. Hence, for any c ∈ Rℓ, an optimal
solution of (16) can be obtained by solving
max
i∈[h]
(
max cT zi subject to zi ∈ Q˜i
)
(17)
Here, for each i, the decision variable zi ∈ Rℓ lies in the set Q˜i. Below we will provide, for each i,
a polynomial-time algorithm, ALGi, that solves the linear optimization problem over Q˜i, i.e., ALGi
efficiently solves max cT zi subject to zi ∈ Q˜i. Hence, ALG can be obtained by directly taking a
maximum over the (optimal) solutions obtained by the ALGis.
We will now complete the chain of arguments mentioned above by designing the optimization
algorithm ALGi. This algorithm is itself based on the Ellipsoid method. As detailed below, the gradi-
ents of the utility function ui (at different points) can be used to separate Q˜i from vectors that are not
contained in it. Hence, with this separation technique in hand, we can apply the Ellipsoid method
over Q˜i to obtain ALGi.
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Given a query vector q ∈ Rℓ, it is easy to test if q ∈ Q˜i := Qi ∩
{
z ∈ Rℓ : ‖z‖ ≤ Λ}. We directly
verify (a) ui(q + ωi) ≥ ui(yi) (to ensure that q ∈ Qi) and (b) ‖q‖ ≤ Λ.26
Consider the case in which q /∈ Q˜i. To run the Ellipsoid method (that underlies ALGi), we need a
separating hyperplane for such a q ∈ Rℓ. There are two complementary (though, nonexclusive) cases
either (i) q /∈ Qi (i.e., ui(q + ωi) < ui(yi)) and (ii) ‖q‖ > Λ.
In case (i), the subgradient at χ := q+ωi provides the separating hyperplane: in particular, for the
PLC utility ui, let k¯ ∈ argmink
{∑
j U
k
i,j χj + T
k
i
}
, i.e., ui(q+ωi) =
∑
j U
k¯
i,jχj +T
k¯
i . The (subgradient)
vector π := (U k¯i,j)j∈[ℓ] provides the desired separation. This follows from the fact that, for any z ∈ Rℓ
we have
ui(z + ωi) ≤ πT (z + ωi) + T k¯i
= πT (q + ωi) + T
k¯
i + π
T (z − q)
= ui(q + ωi) + π
T (z − q) (18)
Specifically, if z ∈ Qi, then ui(z + ωi) ≥ ui(yi) > ui(q + ωi). Hence, using (18), we get the desired
separation
πT q < πT z for all z ∈ Q˜i ⊂ Qi.
25Recall that, Q˜is are compact, convex, and have a nonempty interior. Hence, the Ellipsoid method is applicable over
these sets.
26We do not have to compute Λ exactly. Here, for the algorithm, an upper bound (with polynomial bit complexity) of Λ
suffices.
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In case (ii), the vector π := − qΛ‖q‖ suffices. Note that
πT q = −‖q‖
Λ
< −1 (19)
For any z ∈ Q˜i we have ‖z‖ ≤ Λ. Now, the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality gives us |πT z| ≤ ‖π‖‖z‖ =
1
Λ‖z‖ ≤ 1. This inequality along with (19) shows that π is indeed a separating hyperplane: πT q < πT z
for all z ∈ Q˜i.
Overall, we observe that separation with respect to the Q˜is can be performed efficiently. Hence,
via the Ellipsoid method, we obtain, for each i, the algorithm ALGi that optimizes over Q˜i.
Combining ALGis we get the optimization algorithm (over Q˜) ALG, which, in turn, leads to SEP
(the desired algorithm that separates with respect to Q˜).
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A Other Notions of Approximate Equilibria
In this section we will show that the notion of approximate Walrasian equilibrium considered in this
work relates to other notions studied in computer science and economics.
A common alternate (to the one considered in this work) definition of approximation seeks to
relax how exactly the consumers optimize, see, e.g., [DPS02] and [GMVY17]. This notion requires
that the consumers are approximately maximizing their utilities, though it assumes that the demand
is approximately equal to the supply. Specifically, under this complementary notion, a pair (p, x) ∈
∆ × Rhℓ+ , with price vector p ∈ ∆ and allocation x, is said to be an ε̂-equilibrium (in an economy
E = ((ui, ωi))i with h consumers and ℓ goods) iff the following conditions hold for all consumers
i ∈ [h]:27
(C1) For any bundle y ∈ Rℓ+, with the property that pT y ≤ pTωi, we have ui(y) ≤ ui(xi) + ε̂.
(C2) |pTxi − pTωi| ≤ ε̂.
Note that, (C1) corresponds to the following requirement: ui(xi) ≥
(
maxy∈Rℓ+
{
ui(y) | pT y ≤ pTωi
})−
ε̂.
We will show that an ε-approximate Walrasian equilibrium (as defined in Section 2) satisfies con-
ditions (C1) and (C2) with ε̂ = ελ
√
ℓ
h ; here, λ is the Lipschitz constant of the utilities uis.
By definition (see Section 2), an ε-approximate Walrasian equilibrium, say (p, x), satisfies (C2).28
To establish the claim, next wewill prove the contrapositive form of (C1) holds for (p, x). Consider
a bundle y ∈ Rℓ+ with high utility ui(y) > ui(xi) + ε̂ = ui(xi) + ελ
√
ℓ
h .
Observe that the Euclidean ball B
(
y, ε
√
ℓ
h
)
, with center y and radius ε
√
ℓ
h , is entirely contained
in the upper contour set
{
x ∈ Rℓ+ | ui(x) ≥ ui(xi)
}
. Say, towards a contradiction, that this is not the
case. Then, there exists a bundle y′ ∈ Rℓ+ on the boundary of the upper contour set that is at most
27Note that (C1) and (C2) are a strengthening of the alternate formulation mentioned above, since here we insist that the
demand is exactly equal to the supply.
28Here, assume that ε̂ ≥ ε, otherwise we can consider ε̂ = max
{
ελ
√
ℓ
h
, ε
}
.
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a distance ε
√
ℓ
h away from y, i.e., a boundary point y
′ that satisfies ‖y − y′‖ ≤ ε
√
ℓ
h . Since y
′ is at
the boundary of the upper contour set, ui(y
′) = ui(xi). This fact contradicts the high utility of y:
|ui(y)− ui(y′)| ≤ λ‖y − y′‖ ≤ ελ
√
ℓ
h .
Therefore, in particular, the vector
(
y − ε
√
ℓ
h
p
‖p‖
)
∈ B
(
y, ε
√
ℓ
h
)
belongs to the upper contour set.
That is, ui
(
y − ε
√
ℓ
h
p
‖p‖
)
≥ ui(xi).
Hence, our definition of ε-Walrasian equilibria ensures that
pT
(
y − ε
√
ℓ
h
p
‖p‖
)
≥ pTωi − ε/h (20)
Since the price vector p ∈ ∆, we have ‖p‖ ≥ 1√
ℓ
. Rearranging inequality (20) shows that y satisfies
(the contrapositive form of) the condition (C1): pT y ≥ pTωi.
Supply vs demand and average budge gap. In contrast to some of the other formulations, the defini-
tion of approximate equilibria considered in this work strictly enforces that the supply is equal to the
demand. Also, we consider a bound on the budget gap, |pTxi − pTωi|, for every consumer i. Hence,
our approximate equilibrium satisfies the average budget gap requirement considered in [MC79].
B Illustrative Example of Strongly Concave Utilities
This section provides a simple example to illustrate the interplay of strong concavity and other pa-
rameters related to the utility functions. Consider an economy E = ((ui, ωi))i∈[h] (with h consumers
and ℓ goods) wherein the utility of each consumer is
u(x) :=
1
N
ℓ∑
j=1
√
xj + θ.
Here, xj is the amount of good j (present in the consumption bundle x ∈ Rℓ+), θ > 0 is a fixed
constant, and N > 0 is a normalization term. Here, dividing by a large enough, but fixed, parameter
N ensures that for each feasible bundle x ∈ Rℓ+ in E , we have u(x) ∈ (0, 1). In particular, let ωj denote
the total amount of good j ∈ [ℓ] present in the economy (ωj :=
∑
i ωi,j). Then, N =
∑ℓ
j=1
√
ωj + θ.
Also, note that the additive shift of θ ensures that the gradient of u is bounded for all x ∈ Rℓ+ and
the Lipschitz constant of the utilities λ = 1
2
√
θ
.
One can show that a function u : Rℓ 7→ R is α-strongly concave in a set R ⊂ Rℓ iff f(x) :=
u(x)+α2 ‖x‖2 is concave withinR. That is, for any α > 0, if theHessian of f(x) is negative semidefinite
for all x ∈ R, then u is α strongly concave inR.
The utility function u is separable across the ℓ goods, hence its Hessian (at point x ∈ Rℓ+) is a
diagonal matrix with the (diagonal) entries being −1
4N(xj+θ)3/2
for each j ∈ [ℓ]. That is, for an α > 0
and x ∈ Rℓ+, the Hessian of f is again a diagonal matrix with entries −14N(xj+θ)3/2 + α, with j ∈ [ℓ].
Therefore, within the Euclidean ball of radius r (and center 0), the function u is
(
1
4N(r+θ)3/2
)
-
strongly concave; this value of α ensures that f is negative semidefinite throughout the ball.
As stated in Section 2, we require strongly concavity to hold within an appropriately large set
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around the endowments.29 Specially, we need αr2 ≥ 2ελℓh + 2 (see Section 2). Using the above-
mentioned expression for the modulus of strong concavity, α, the required inequality translates to
√
r
4N(1 + θ/r)3/2
≥ 2ελℓ
h
+ 2
The left-hand-side of the previous inequality is an increasing function of r. Hence, this inequal-
ity holds for an appropriately large r (which only depends on the parameters of E and not on the
replication factor n). With this r and the corresponding value of α in hand one can apply the results
developed in this work.
C Proof of Lemma 2.1
This section shows that, if the utilities of the consumers are strictly monotonic, continuous, and
strictly concave, then allocations in the h-core of a replica economy satisfy the equal treatment prop-
erty.
Let x = (x1,1, . . . , x1,h, . . . , xn,1, . . . , xn,h) be an h-core allocation of the economy En. We will show
that if x does not satisfy the equal treatment property, then a coalition of size h—consisting of the
worse off consumers of each type—will block the allocation x, contradicting the fact that it is in the
h-core.
Say, towards a contradiction, that x does not satisfy the equal treatment property. Since each
consumer of type t ∈ [h] has the same utility function, we can select the worse off consumer among
the n ones that have type t; in particular, for each t ∈ [h], let index j∗(t) ∈ [n] be such that ut(xj∗(t),t) ≤
ut(xi,t) for all i ∈ [n].
Consider the size-h coalition S := {(j∗(t), t)}t∈[h] and the S-allocation (x̂t)(t∈[h]) defined as x̂t :=
1
n
∑n
i=1 xi,t.
Note that (x̂t)t∈[h] is indeed an S-allocation: Since x is an allocation in En, it satisfies
∑n
i=1
∑h
t=1 xi,t =∑n
i=1
∑h
t=1 ωt =
∑h
t=1 nωt. Dividing by n gives us
∑h
t=1 x̂t =
∑h
t=1 ωt. Therefore, the consumers in
the coalition S can trade among themselves and, individually, obtain bundles x̂ts.
Furthermore, the strict concavity of uts ensures that ut(x̂t) ≥ ut(xj∗(t),t) for all (j∗(t), t) ∈ S—
with one of the inequalities being strict. Hence, coalition S blocks the allocation x and, by way of
contradiction, the stated claim follows.
29For ease of presentation, here we assume that the endowments are 0. Shifting all the vectors by −ωi, directly provide
the arguments for general endowment vectors.
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